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ABSTRACT
The Triple-Helix-Model stresses the idea that a successful national 
system of innovation ought to incorporate the complexity of three social 
subsystems: private sector economy, governmental system and science. 
Following the insight that the state and its agencies are important players 
in any system of innovation, we take a closer look at the innovative action 
in the public sphere. Therefore, we propose an analytical tool that allows 
a more detailed explanation of relevant determinants of innovative 
behaviour: (1) property rights, (2) capabilities, and (3) motivation. In order 
to show the relevance of these determinants, we tested the plausibility 
of our theoretical tool against the topic of public procurement of 
innovation. Five hypotheses were derived and then tested empirically by 
using a data set about German public procurement practice. Our linear 
regression model provides evidence for the hypotheses that framework 
conditions, special training, and motivation of procurement staff play a 
central role in demand-driven innovation of the public sector.
Keywords: innovation, Triple-Helix approach, public sector economics, capacity building, 
procurement of innovation
JEL: B52, H 83, O31, P48
1 Introduction
While the connection between innovation, growth and social development is 
usually examined with relation to private sector enterprises (Audretsch et al. 
2006), in recent years the innovation capabilities of other social subsystems 
have moved into the point of view. Moreover, the public sector and public 
management capabilities can be seen as an important part of the economic 
development of regions or countries. As a reference, one can state explicitly 
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the literature on “varieties of capitalism” (see Hall & Soskice, 2001; Elsner 
& Hanappi, 2008) as well as studies that use a “National Business Systems” 
approach (Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1999). Insofar, the efficiency of the 
public sector can be interpreted as an important location factor in a global 
competitive process as well (e.g. Kristensen & Lilja, 2011). Nevertheless, these 
recent developments are only partly reflected in the scope of the literature 
on innovation theory (Greenhalgh & Rogers, 2010; Daskalakis, 2010). In order 
to do so, we propose in this paper a theoretical model that is applicable to the 
market sector as well as to the public sector.
The paper is structured as follows: We briefly introduce research on innovation 
that is based on the Triple-Helix-Model and present our approach to explain 
innovative behaviour. Following the early work of Röpke (1977), we use 
three kinds of variables as our determinants of innovative action: property 
rights, capabilities and motivation. Based on this theoretical background we 
develop further considerations with regard to the possibilities and problems 
of innovative action that might (or might not) take place in the sphere of 
bureaucracy (2). The focus will be on innovation in the public sphere and 
the field of public procurement has been chosen as a principal example to 
demonstrate the workability of our analytical tool (3–5). The paper ends with 
a conclusion (6), showing that the results for the innovation system might 
be substantial: If the relevant players are not allowed to innovate, public 
managers do not have the capabilities to innovate, or are not motivated 
to innovate, then the structural coupling between government and the 
economic system will not succeed in the long run. As a result, there will be 
negative consequences for the national system of innovation, e.g. the ability 
of a society to develop by innovative advances.
2 Innovation Theory and Public Administration
In the economic literature on innovation, one can distinguish at least two 
different branches of theory: While in industrial economics (or endogenous 
growth theory) particularly hypotheses about the macroeconomic effects 
of innovation are picked out as a central theme, the branch of evolutionary 
economics analyses the endogenous causes of the innovation process (for 
a broad survey see Fagerberg, Moweira & Nelson, 2006). Consequently, the 
role as well as typical characteristics of entrepreneurship can be seen as the 
core of this line of theoretical reasoning (Röpke, 2002; Fagerberg, 2003; 
Fagerberg, 2006). The latter approach is used here because it seems to be 
much broader in its applicability, especially with regard to topics like the 
system of public administration. In our view, one should deal more thoroughly 
with the possibilities as well as restrictions of innovative behaviour in the non-
profit sectors (public management, non-profit organisations) of an economy 
(Zimmermann et al., 1998). In other words, there is a need to strengthen the 
innovative capabilities of the state. This thesis has been furthermore stressed 
by work on the interdisciplinary nature of innovation, e.g. Goto (2000, p. 104): 
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“The national innovation system essentially consists of three sectors: industry, 
universities, and the government, with each sector interacting with the 
others, while at the same time playing its own role“. One of the models that 
can be used to describe the interactions between different societal systems 
has been labelled “Triple-Helix-Model“ (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000) which 
is explicitly based on the complex nature and interactions between the three 
subsystems economy, science and state.
2.1 The Triple-Helix-Approach and Systems of Innovation
Against this background of innovation theory in the literature, it should 
be obvious that the national system of innovation is somehow a complex 
building with one system interacting with the other subsystems (Leydesdorff, 
2010, 5ff.). Therefore, the Triple-Helix-Model is used as a metaphor for the 
fundamental relationships between the three social subsystems economics, 
science and government. On the one hand, the characteristics of these 
corresponding networks are defined. On the other hand, the differences 
regarding the incentive structure and the flexibility of transformation are 
stressed. The aim is mainly to describe and explain structural developments 
of a knowledge-based economy. In application to the case of public 
administration, we find more hierarchical structures of decision, different 
ways to generate and transfer knowledge as well as other incentive systems 
to the staff.
In addition, of course, the public sector influences both other subsystems 
by different means, e.g. legislation and regulation. The model is therefore 
closely connected to the Systems of Innovation (SI) approach, which can be 
defined as “all important economic, social, political, organizational, and other 
factors that influence the development, diffusion, and use of innovations“ 
(Edquist, 1997, p. 14). However, as Edquist (2001, p. 3) in a discussion about 
SI has already remarked, there has been a weakness of the SI approach since 
„it lacks a ‘theoretical’ component about the role of the state. This is an 
important neglect, since the state and its agencies are obviously important 
determinants of innovation in any SI“.
As a first step, it seems plausible to discuss the role of the state by looking 
at the mechanisms used to influence the innovation system, e.g. through 
public innovation policy. In general, innovation policy can be described as 
all public action that has an impact on technical change or influences other 
kinds of innovations (Edquist, 2002). On the supply side, this mainly means 
science&technology policy, e.g. the public provision of basic research as a 
public good. But innovation policy goes beyond by including elements of 
research&development, technology and infrastructure policy as well as 
regional policy and education policy. In consequence, innovation policy can 
influence innovation just as much from the demand side. In this respect, 
especially public procurement is of importance. Therefore, the case study 
that will follow is related to the field of public procurements as an instrument.
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Furthermore, Edquist (2001, p. 10f.) suggests that function or determinants 
of innovation should be given more emphasis, because such work would be 
an important attempt to raise the theoretical status of the SI approach. Thus, 
explanatory work should include a specification of the relative importance of 
determinants as well as the relations between them, which might vary between 
certain kinds of innovation, e.g. process or product innovation. In short, he 
expects knowledge progress by integrating „conceptual and theoretical 
work with empirical studies in an effort to identify determinants“. This path 
of research is followed by Edquist and Zabala-Ihurriagagoitia (2012), who 
categorize public procurement for innovation along three dimensions: first, 
the user of the purchased good; second, the character of the procurement 
process; and third, the cooperative or non-cooperative nature of the process. 
In accordance to this, our proposed approach can be interpreted as an 
additional framework that allows to obtain testable statements. And it will 
be accomplished by an empirical analysis in the field of public procurement 
as well.
Another way to classify the role of the state has been given by Greenhalgh 
and Rogers (2010, p. 103f.), who focus on the topic of public action. They 
assume that the most relevant topics with regard to innovative activities will 
be intellectual Property Rights (patent law, product permissions), tax policy 
(enterprise taxation, depreciation possibilities, establishment promotion), 
competition policy (regulation of monopolies, merger control), public 
subsidies for scientific research, standardisation, and public procurement. 
However, since every listed topic above involves different network agents 
as well as incentive structures, it seems to be necessary to discuss them 
separately. Yet, this is the third reason why we will concentrate on the field 
of public procurement in our case study. But initially, we have to describe 
our conceptual approach for the analysis of the determinants of innovative 
behaviour.
2.2 Determinants of Innovative Behaviour
Our general explanation of innovative behaviour, either on the individual 
or organisational level, uses three measurable variables: the structure 
and incentives of property rights, the degree of individual capabilities and 
knowledge (competences) and, last but not least, motivational aspects. In the 
concrete, these determinants of innovative behaviour can be understood as 
follows:
1. Property rights: In short, under this heading one can assume all formal 
and informal rules, which limit the acting of individuals or organisations. 
They can be further divided up in property rights on the level of the 
economy, the level of organisation as well as on the level of societies, 
e.g. cultural values (Röpke, 1983, p. 122ff.). In particular, for the field 
of public administration it might be of serious concern that innovation 
in the public sphere is often not very welcome. Instead, there is a “rule 
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of tradition” that will be altered by new ways of action (Picot & 
Schneider, 1988, 99ff.). Alternatively, to put this in pure economic 
terms, the resulting benefits for all parties involved will be changed 
by innovation, resulting in new distribution patterns of economic 
resources. In fact, some political interest groups will suffer from 
innovation externalities, which is one of the reasons why innovative 
solutions have much higher transaction costs than routine actions. 
However, it should be noted in this context that there is a controversial 
discussion about the role of property rights in creating incentives to 
innovate. To put it in a nutshell, if patent policies foster the diffusion 
of knowledge and stimulate market entry and competition, then 
there might be social benefits from stronger incentives to innovate. 
On the contrary, assigning strong intellectual property rights to early 
inventors may discourage innovation, e.g. due to litigation risks of 
later generations of inventors (see Boldrin & Levine, 2013; Moser, 
2013). Recently, the growing prominence of patent aggregators called 
“Intellectual Ventures has sparked heated debates about the economic 
role played by intermediaries in the patent market and their effects on 
innovation” (Hagiu & Yoffie, 2013, p. 46).
2. Capabilities (competences): One of the preconditions for discoveries 
or the implementation of innovation can be seen in the cognitive 
capabilities of an individual. In abstract terms: “creativity proves to be 
the outstanding component of the innovation process, since it affects 
the decision and action logic of the individual strongly” (Brandstätter, 
1992, p. 98ff., own translation). With regard to this variable the genetic 
equipment as well as the level of education and training plays an 
important role.
3. Motivation: Even if innovative action is allowed by property rights and 
the staff has the required cognitive abilities, then there still might be 
a last barrier to innovation: Individuals can simply not be motivated 
enough to leave a “life in routines” for innovative new solutions. We 
base these considerations on the so-called “achievement motivation 
theory” developed by McClelland and Heckhausen. Its core hypothesis 
can be summarized as follows: human beings are mainly motivated 
by personal achievements; ideally, they choose those tasks where the 
degree of difficulty is somehow “in the middle range”, meaning that 
the result of action can be attributed to one’s own achievements 
(McClelland & Heckhausen, 1980). Of course, the motivation of 
individuals can be affected positively or negatively by the usage of 
either extrinsic or intrinsic incentives.
As is shown by figure 1, all three variables are interconnected to each other 
and work as filter for innovative behaviour.
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Figure 1: Explanation of innovative behaviour
Source: Röpke (1987, p. 233).
Based on this set of variables, one will be able to formulate hypothesis with 
regard to the consequences of organisational and political reform or to 
determine the window of opportunity to innovate inside public administration. 
As an analytical tool, it might help in showing the important consequences 
for the functioning of the innovation system. If the personnel in public 
administration is not allowed or not able or not motivated to innovate, then 
the structural connection to the other sectors (science and economy) will not 
succeed in the long term. This problem might be eliminated by other actors 
of the national system of innovation, at least as long as these actors have the 
necessary opportunities of action at their hand.
Next, we use this theoretical framework to examine whether the political 
staff or respectively the public administration will have the necessary degree 
of freedom for innovative behaviour. Therefore, we first take a look at the 
legal restrictions for innovative policies. Followed by a discussion of the way 
official staff is likely to act as an “intrapreneur” in his or her organisation. 
Finally, ways for using the huge amount of “tacit knowledge” incorporated 
in public administration for the production of public goods will be explained. 
The strength of our proposed framework can be seen in the fact that we will 
be able to analyse innovative behaviour on the micro level by means of the 
public staff as well as on the macro level by property rights set by the national 
system of innovation. In order to show the workability of our theoretical 
considerations, we now apply our model to the field of public procurement 
in Germany.
3 Selection of Case Analysis: Public Procurement
Public procurement has a huge potential for innovative behaviour of public 
authorities. In 20081, Eurostat estimated a total procurement volume for the 
EU27 of 17.3% of GDP (equivalent to 2.16 billion €), a number showing that 
the public sector has a significant market power. Regarding single product 
1 Own calculations based on Eurostat (2010). The estimations tend to exceed the actual 
procurement volume, since, for example, spending by the social insurance system is taken 
into account (Audet, 2002; Weber, 2010).
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groups respectively sectors such as ICT, the public demand reaches such a large 
proportion that further market development can be emanated from this major 
impetus. Similarly, considerable impetus to public institutions themselves can 
be emanated from purchasing innovative products and services. Just to give 
an illustrative example, it can be referenced to the introduction of workflow 
management software and document management systems, which can 
deeply interfere in the procedures of the concerned institution (Lorenz et al., 
2009, 39f.). With reference to the interaction between impetus to the public 
institutions through the purchase of innovative solutions on the one hand, 
and the innovation-promoting effect on the suppliers by a challenging public 
demand on the other hand, the second aspect is gaining more and more 
political importance. Therefore, public procurement has been increasingly 
granted with the suitability as an instrument of innovation-oriented demand 
policies (Edler et al., 2005; European Commission, 2007a, 2007b; Edquist 
et al., 2000; Georghiou et. al., 2010). By way of example, one can refer to 
procurement practices in the UK (Hughes et al., 2011), even on the local 
level (see Uyarra, 2010), or the initiative of the European commission under 
Horizon 2020 (European Commission, 2011).
Furthermore, especially in overcoming the so-called “Valley of Death” this 
kind of demand for novel solutions can play an important role. The Valley 
of Death is a common term in the entrepreneurship world, relating to the 
serious challenge of covering the negative cash flow in the early stages of a 
new venture, before the innovation (service or product) is generating revenue 
from real customers (see Osawa & Miyazaki, 2006; House of Commons, 2013). 
Beside this general difficulty of start-ups, Beard et al. (2009) have argued 
that the Valley of Death occurs especially in the presence of ‘non-economic’ 
investments, foremost with regard to government expenditures on basic 
research. Public Procurement might close the gap between public funded 
research in early stages and private investment decisions at later stages of the 
innovation process. The challenging needs of the public sector can directly 
lead to the development of novel solutions and to the setup of production 
capacities. At a sufficient expectation of benefit, the public sector can take 
considerable risks in this context, e.g. maintaining start-up’s or specialized 
suppliers.
The public procurement of innovation can be regarded as an exemplary case 
for innovation activities in the Triple-Helix-Model: With regard to purchasing, 
the given relationship between government and economy is expanded by 
a research and development aspect. All three social sub-systems interact 
with each other in such projects, whereby science and economy cope with 
their specific function of production of knowledge or goods and services 
respectively. Moreover, due to this constellation, there will arise new 
challenges for public administration. The purchasing of innovation requires 
actions with a strong innovation orientation, which is often in tension to the 
legislative framework regulating procurement. Here, innovation orientation 
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is often accompanied by the innovative handling of procedures (Lorenz 
et al., 2009, pp. 64–75). Given these interactions, innovative behaviour is 
understood, in terms of the theoretical approach developed above, as an 
innovative processing method, as innovation-oriented procurement practice 
and simply as purchasing innovation.
Thus, the public purchase involves the potential for considerable innovation 
impetus to public administration, economy and science. Given this vast 
potential, the inventory of the innovation orientation and the innovation 
degree of the German federal procurement practice is sobering. Regarding 
the procurement strategy, promoting innovation plays only a subordinate 
role and, instead of comprehensive economic criteria, the purchasing price 
dominates as a key award criterion for public contracts. This makes an 
awarding of innovative solutions unlikely (Weber, 2009). A fact, that needs to 
be explained in order to derive ways of its evaluation and overcoming.
4 Hypotheses about Determinants of Public Sector 
Innovation in Public Purchasing
In order to explain the above stated gap between a potential and an empirical 
use of public procurement as a tool for demand-driven innovation, we now 
consider the three variables of innovative behaviour in more detail. In order to 
do so, we first derive some hypotheses from our analytical tool that will then 
be tested in the next chapter by using our empirical data set from German 
public procurement.
4.1 Property Rights
Initially, the function of property rights, defined as an opportunity space for 
action, seems to be simple: Public authorities can define their requirements 
and the solution they need to meet their demands without constraints. In 
principle, the property rights are fully held by public authorities, while 
enterprises get the chance to adjust their offer to the requirements described 
in the calls for tenders. However, in reality we can observe constraints on 
different levels of the procurement process, which hinder public authorities 
to make use of their rights. In short, two different types of constraining factors 
can be distinguished: The internal structure of public authorities and external 
constraints respectively the way public servants deal with these constraints.
First, public authorities cannot be dealt with “as if” there is only one single 
unique entity. Many different stakeholders in the organisation try to achieve 
different and partly contradictory goals (Edler et al., 2005, p. 40ff.). The 
political level and the level of strategic management are two powerful players 
in this game. If politics and management differ in their aims related to public 
procurement, different priorities of departments should be taken into account 
as well. For example, while the department which finances the project might 
only be interested in a low initial price, the department which has to deal with 
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the maintenance of the procured product (e.g. a new building) might focus 
on initially more expensive and probably more innovative solutions to lower 
costs in the long run. A clear strategic priority and the political will to foster 
innovation is essential to overcome these conflicting interests. Thus, our first 
hypothesis with regard to property rights reads as follows:
H1: An explicit strategy and political support enable procurer to strengthen 
innovation orientation in public procurement.
Second, the most powerful external constraint is the legal framework the 
purchasing agencies have to deal with. Many public procurers experience 
that the density of procurement regulation inevitably leads to legal mistakes 
in nearly any process. This external constraint, which does not influence the 
objective of the purchasing process directly, produces an error risk, which 
causes risk-avoiding behaviour of civil servants (Otter et al., 2007, p. 100). 
In sum, internal structure and external constraints favour a conservative 
procurement practice. On this organisational and legal background, success is 
measured by absence of mistakes and not by procuring innovative solutions:
H2: The willingness to take risk is required to make use of instruments of 
innovation orientation.
4.2 Capabilities, Competences, Capacities
Both, conflicting interests and failure risks signify the need for highly skilled 
civil servants. Employees who want to purchase innovative solutions have 
to deal with legal, organisational, and technical risks (European Commission 
2010) in a convenient and convincing way. To cope with all these challenges 
two aspects have be taken into consideration: education and training for 
the staff and a professionalization of procuring agencies. In many cases 
procurement is not part of the key competences and functions of public 
agencies. As a consequence purchasing is executed as side job by civil servants 
without special training (Lorenz et al. 2009, 57). It can be expected that this 
absence of special training will have an impact on the innovative behaviour:
H3: Skilled and especially trained procurement staff leads to more innovative 
behaviour in public procurement.
Another way to cope with the broad range of requirements is the outsourcing 
of the task to specialised units. Thus:
H4: A centralised structure of procurement with specialised procurement 
units leads to more innovative behaviour in public procurement.
4.3 Motivation
Despite some hindering framework conditions, many cases of public 
procurement of innovation procedures can be observed in practice. In many 
of these cases, highly motivated civil servants guarantee the achievement of 
these purchasing projects. These employees can be described as intrapreneurs 
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who drive forward the organisation they are working for. However, these cases 
cannot conceal the fact that administrative culture in general favours acting 
in accordance with the law or other organisational routines. Fault tolerance, 
learning by errors, and giving something new a chance are by no means 
generic elements of administrative culture (Krone, 2003). In addition, public 
authorities offer little incentives to foster motivation of their employees. 
Thus, motivation is expected to be a critical factor for innovative behaviour 
of public agencies:
H5: Motivation of procurement staff has a strong impact on innovative 
behaviour in public agencies procurement.
5 Empirical Investigation
Our data allow the empirical testing of the above stated hypotheses for the 
German Case. The next paragraph will deliver a description of the database as 
well as the operationalization of the theoretical constructs. Then, the findings 
of the statistical model are presented, followed by a short discussion of some 
mayor constraints of the analysis.
5.1 Database and Operationalization of Theoretical Constructs
To get an empirical inside of German procurement agencies we use data 
from a survey conducted in 2009. The survey was part of the research project 
“Purchasing State” which was partly funded by the German Federal Ministry 
of Education and Research (Lorenz et al., 2009). The survey realised 265 
responses of all types of German procurement agencies, which corresponds 
to a response rate of 11.5%. The questionnaire covered a wide range of 
different aspects with relevance to innovation-orientation. For hypotheses 
testing six theoretical concepts have to be measured (Table 1).
Table 1: Operationalization of theoretical concepts
Variable Measurement concept
Property rights
Innovation-friendly 
framework conditions
Strategic orientation in favour of innovation procurement in contradiction to 
initial costs and political influence on procurement practises
Encouraged risk-taking Share of new suppliers and share of more sophisticated award criteria than the initial prices
Capabilities, competences, capacities
Special training Existence of special trainings of procurement staff
Centralised structure Procurement only by centralised units and probably by external service provider
Motivation
Motivation of 
procurement staff
Optimistic assessment of purchasing instruments for fostering innovation in 
public procurement
Innovative behaviour
Innovation-orientation of 
procurement practices
Participation of internal knowledge carriers and stakeholders, innovation as 
aim of negotiations, innovation-friendly procedural aspects, innovation-related 
aspects in technical specifications, internal and external cooperation, use of 
various way of market observation
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5.2 Statistical Modelling
The distribution of the dependent variable allows the application of linear 
regression analyses. The independent variables are statistically independent 
and the statistic of residuals does not show any indication of violating 
distribution assumptions. The model is printed in Table 2.
Table 2: Linear regression on innovation-orientation
Coefficient (beta)
Framework 0.174 *
Risk-taking 0.002
Training 0.170 *
Structure 0.029
Motivation 0.340 *
R2 adjusted 0.206 *
202 valid cases 
Significance: * 99%
The model shows medium effect of framework conditions and specialised 
training on innovation-orientation in public procurement and a strong effect 
of motivation. All three effects are significant on the 99%-level. Encouraged 
risk-taking and a centralised structure have no significant effect on the 
depended variable. The whole model fits with an adjusted R2 of 0.2 well and 
is although highly significant.
The statistical model provides empirical evidence for the hypotheses 1, 3 and 
5. Framework conditions, special training, and motivation of procurement 
staff have significant positive impact on innovative behaviour in public 
procurement. In contrast, we have to reject hypotheses 2 and 4 at this stage 
of analysis. Neither for risk-taking nor for the organisational structure can we 
observe a significant impact. Nevertheless, our results of the case study stress 
the importance of all three determinants of innovative behaviour. Property 
rights, capabilities, and motivation influence the way public authorities fulfil 
their duties.
5.3 Constraints
Although the above findings suggest that all three aspects might determine 
innovative behaviour, attention must also be drawn to some restriction of 
the empirical model. First, the empirical investigation suffers from those 
constraints which are typical for a secondary analysis: The survey might 
probably be biased towards a positive selection of cases. It seems to be 
plausible that large authorities with a more professionalized procurement 
structure had answered more likely. In addition, the operationalization 
of theoretical concepts is limited to the indicators surveyed. This might 
compromise the validity of the empirical concepts to some extent, e.g. 
especially the indicator for motivation seems to be critical in this context. 
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Probably this indicator is just too close to the innovation indicator. Thus, the 
effect might be overestimated.
Second, the analysis offers only a rough modelling of the theoretical 
considerations. On the one hand the determinants of innovative behaviour are 
not logically independent. To some extent property rights are a precondition 
for the effectiveness of capabilities and motivation. On the other hand the 
model ends with the explanation of innovative action. Innovative behaviour 
is one important determinant of innovative output, but it is not the only one. 
A more complex modelling can help to overcome these constraints. Such a 
model has to consider interaction effects as well as control variables, like 
the type of procuring organisation and procured products and services. To 
model these interaction effects in a second iteration, one has to specify the 
theoretical considerations in more detail. Additionally a two steps regression 
analysis can show the effect of innovative behaviour and innovation impact.
6 Conclusion
Public procurement of innovation can be seen as innovative behaviour in two 
ways. On the one hand, efficient procedures offer significant saving potential 
and effective targeting of public needs improve quality of purchased 
solutions. On the other hand public procurement levers innovative behaviour 
in the private sector. The analytical framework developed here offers an 
opportunity to get a better understanding of the fact that practices in 
procuring innovative solution are still subject to different restrictions. The 
analysis was based on three determinants of innovative behaviour: property 
rights, competencies, and motivation. In order to show the relevance of 
our proposed determinants, we tested the plausibility of our theoretical 
tool against the topic of public procurement of innovation. Therefore, five 
hypotheses were derived in connection to the process of public procurement 
and then tested empirically by using a data set from German public 
procurement practice. Our linear regressions model provides evidence for 
the hypotheses that framework conditions, special training, and motivation 
of procurement staff play a central role in demand-driven innovation of the 
public sector. In contrast to this, our hypotheses about risk-taking as well as 
organisational structure were rejected. In sum, hindering constraints inside 
and outside public agencies, a lack of motivating elements in administrative 
culture, and the antagonism between the low level of public procurement 
training and the complexity of innovation-oriented procurement practices are 
important barriers to make procurement an instrument to foster innovation 
of public authorities as well as of private enterprises.
But the determinants cannot only be used to describe the main problems, they 
might as well serve as a starting point to overcome these barriers. Likewise, 
the identified obstacles describe the areas of interest which should be 
modified to make use of public procurement as a broader policy instrument. 
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Many initiatives especially on the European level can be observed to facilitate 
procurement of innovative solution by public agencies. To name a few, the 
modernisation of European procurement regulation has to be mentioned as 
well as subsidies for dealing with risks in innovation-oriented procurement 
procedures. Thus, in medium terms procurement professionals might get 
the full set of property rights for buying more innovative solutions. In the 
meanwhile, the awareness of the positive impact of public procurement of 
innovation on the solution of great societal challenges like climate change and 
financial crisis is rising. This growing awareness might become an important 
source for the motivation of procurement professionals. Many additional 
trends foster public procurement of innovation by additional property rights 
and by motivating civil servants.
In the area of capabilities, the solution seems to be quite simple. More and 
better-trained procurement staff might lead to a boost for buying innovative 
solutions. Keeping budget restrictions in mind, certain functional equivalents 
might be needed. Empirical evidence can be found that three aspects can 
significantly contribute to enable civil servants to buy innovative products:
1. Modernisation of purchasing procedures: electronic support for 
purchasing stuff might help to avoid mistakes. Suitable electronic 
government solutions are required to implement e-procurement 
systems (Lorenz et al. 2009, p. 71f.).
2. Open innovation platforms: cooperation between different 
departments and external actors, especially potential suppliers, are 
crucial for the success of innovation projects. Electronic platforms 
can provide a medium for the interaction between relevant partners 
and can help civil servants to gather required technical and market 
information (ICLEI et al., 2015).
3. Reference to standards: referencing standards in technical specification 
allows the usage of codified and accepted knowledge about technical 
details. Thus, standards offer an affordable and easy way to consider 
quality aspects (Blind & Weber, 2012).
From our point of view, it is crucial to consider first the options for action in 
public authority to analyse the impacts on the other subsystems. Innovative 
action might even lead to a “creative destruction” of the rule of traditions in 
socio-economic institutions in the sense of Schumpeter (Otter, 2009). Given 
public budget restrictions, only the recombination of existing resources might 
cause impulses to innovativeness and growth. In this sense, innovative and 
innovation-oriented public authorities do not only guarantee the efficiency 
of their services. Instead, they can contribute to a dynamic innovation policy, 
which helps to overcome the great challenges. Without additional resources 
and only by recombining existing assets, significant efficiency growth and 
impulses for innovation in economy and science can be achieved. Thereby 
electronic support and use of existing knowledge might facilitate the building 
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of required capacities. Thus, enabling innovation in public authorities becomes 
one key factor to respond to the current societal challenges.
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POVZETEK
1.01 Originalni znanstveni članek
Determinante inovacij v javnem sektorju: primer 
razvoja zmogljivosti v javnih naročilih
Ključne besede: inovacija, model trojne spirale, ekonomika javnega sektorja, razvoj 
zmogljivosti, javna naročila za inovacije
Glede na spoznanje, da so država in njeni organi v katerem koli inovacijskem 
sistemu pomembni dejavniki, raziskuje avtor inovativno aktivnost v javni 
upravi.
Članek na kratko predstavlja raziskave o inovativnosti, ki temeljijo na t. i. modelu 
trojne spirale (ang. Triple-Helix Model) in na nacionalnem sistemu pristopa 
k inovacijam. Model trojne spirale izhaja iz ideje, da bi uspešen nacionalni 
inovacijski sistem moral vključevati tri kompleksne družbene podsisteme 
in sicer: gospodarstvo zasebnega sektorja, državo in znanost. Model trojne 
spirale se namreč uporablja kot metafora za medsebojne povezave med 
temi sektorji. Opredeljuje značilnosti pripadajočih mrež, medtem ko na drugi 
strani poudarja razlike glede strukture spodbud in spremenljivosti. A kot je v 
razpravi o inovacijski sistemih pripomnil že Edquist (2001, str. 3), se slabost 
pristopa k inovacijskim sistemom kaže predvsem v pomanjkanju »teoretične« 
komponente o vlogi države.
To je pomembna pomanjkljivost, saj so država in njeni organi več kot očitno 
pomembne determinante inovacij v katerem koli inovacijskem sistemu. Zato 
Edquist predlaga, da bi se funkciji oziroma determinantam inovacij prisodilo 
več poudarka, kar bi pomembno razširilo teoretični pristop k inovacijskem 
sistemu. Tako bi povezali »konceptualno in teoretično delo z empiričnimi 
študijami, tako opredelili determinante in povečali znanje.«
V skladu s tem je predlagani pristop mogoče razumeti kot dodaten okvir, ki 
omogoča pridobitev preverljivih trditev. Na osnovi zgodnjega dela Röpkeja 
(1977) so kot determinante inovativne dejavnosti uporabljene naslednje tri 
vrste spremenljivk: lastninske pravice, zmožnosti in motivacija. Na podlagi 
tega teoretičnega ozadja so bile ugotovljene možnosti in problemi inovativne 
dejavnosti, ki bi se lahko uresničile ali bi nastali v administraciji. Kot analitično 
orodje bi slednje lahko pomagalo pri prepoznavanju pomembnih posledic za 
delovanje inovacijskega sistema. Če zaposlenim v javni upravi ni dovoljeno 
oziroma ti niso zmožni ali motivirani za inovacije, potem strukturna povezava 
z drugimi sektorji (znanostjo in gospodarstvom) na dolgi rok ne bo uspešna.
Javna naročila za inovacije je mogoče šteti za vzoren primer inovativnih 
aktivnosti v modelu trojne spirale. Pri nabavi se razmerje med vlado in 
gospodarstvom razširja z vidika raziskovanja in razvoja. V takšnih projektih 
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sodelujejo vsi trije družbeni podsistemi, pri čemer znanost in gospodarstvo 
opravljata svojo specifično funkcijo proizvodnje znanja ali dobrin in storitev.
Še več, zaradi omenjenega medsebojnega odnosa nastajajo novi izzivi za 
javno upravo. Nabava inovacij zahteva ukrepe z odločno usmerjenostjo k 
inovacijam, kar pa pogosto ovira obstoječa zakonodaja, ki ureja javna naročila. 
Usmerjenost k inovacijam pogosto spremlja tudi inovativno ravnanje s 
postopki (Lorenz in drugi, 2009, 64–75). Glede na te povezave, se inovativno 
vedenje razume v smislu zgoraj razvitega teoretičnega pristopa kot inovativna 
metoda obravnave, kot inovativno usmerjena praksa javnega naročanja in 
preprosto kot nabavna inovacija.
Zato javna naročila vsebujejo potencial precejšnje inovacijske spodbude tako 
za javno upravo in gospodarstvo, kot tudi za znanost. Glede na ta velikanski 
potencial, pregled usmerjenosti v inovacije in stopnja inovativnosti nemške 
zvezne prakse javnega naročanja precej razočarata. Spodbujanje inovativnosti 
pri strategiji javnega naročanja ima zgolj podrejeno vlogo, pri čemer je za 
oddajo javnih naročil, namesto številnih gospodarskih sodil ključna nabavna 
cena. Prav zaradi tega je sprejem inovativnih rešitev malo verjeten (Weber, 
2009).
Da bi pojasnili zgoraj navedeno vrzel med potencialno in dejansko prakso 
javnega naročanja, kot orodja za inovacije, odvisne od povpraševanja, članek 
podrobneje obravnava tri spremenljivke inovativnega vedenja. V ta namen 
najprej izhaja iz hipoteze o pozitivnem vplivu petih dejavnikov iz analitičnega 
orodja, to so: okvirni pogoji, prevzemanje tveganja, posebno usposabljanje, 
organizacijska struktura in motivacija.
Z uporabo podatkov iz nemške prakse javnega naročanja lahko preverimo 
zgoraj navedene hipoteze. Statistični model zagotavlja empirični dokaz za 
hipoteze, da imajo okvirni pogoji, posebno usposabljanje in motiviranost 
zaposlenih na področju javnega naročanja precejšen pozitivni vpliv na 
inovativno vedenje pri javnih naročilih. Prav nasprotno pa pri hipotezah 
glede tveganja in organizacijske strukture ne moremo opaziti pomembnega 
vpliva. Vendar rezultati študije primera poudarjajo pomembnost vseh treh 
determinant inovativnega vedenja. Lastninske pravice (splošni pogoji), 
zmožnosti (posebno usposabljanje) in motivacija (spodbujanje) vplivajo na 
način dela javnih organov. Analitični okvir, razvit v tej raziskavi, pa omogoča 
boljše razumevanje dejstva, da je praksa naročanja inovativnih rešitev še 
vedno zelo omejena.
Skratka, številne ovire v delovanju in povezovanju organov javnega sektorja, 
pomanjkanje motivacijskih elementov v upravni kulturi in nasprotje med 
nizko ravnjo usposabljanja za javna naročila ter kompleksnostjo inovacijsko 
usmerjene prakse javnega naročanja, preprečujejo, da bi javno naročanje 
postalo instrument za spodbujanje inovativnosti javnih organov kot tudi 
zasebnih podjetij. Rezultati inovacijskega sistema bi lahko bili precejšnji: 
vendar če pomembnim akterjem ni dovoljeno inovirati, javni menedžerji pa 
niso zmožni ali niso motivirani za inoviranje, potem se vlada in gospodarski 
sistem pri tej nalogi še dolgo ne bosta uspešno povezala.
